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Informal rigour is the process by which we come to under-
stand particular mathematical structures and then manifest this
rigour through axiomatisations. Structural relativity is the idea
that the kinds of structures we isolate are dependent upon the
logic we employ. We bring together these ideas by considering
the level of informal rigour exhibited by our set-theoretic dis-
course, and argue that it is best captured by a logic intermediate
between first- and second-order. We argue that the usual divi-
sion of structures into particular (e.g. the natural number struc-
ture) and general (e.g. the group structure) is perhaps too coarse
grained; we should also make a distinction between intentionally
and unintentionally general structures.
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Introduction
Mathematicians are often concerned with elucidating structure. In this
paper, I’ll examine some issues arising under the following assump-
tion:
(Weak Structuralist Assumption) Part of mathematics and
its practice can be understood as isolating and studying dif-
ferent structures.
Why is this assumption ‘weak’? Well, the usual statement of struc-
turalism is that mathematics just is the study of structure.1 We do not
make such a strong claim. Rather, we are just assuming the highly
plausible claim that mathematics is at least partly concerned with the
specification and study of structure.
Two questions are immediately pertinent:
1. What kinds of different structures are there?
2. How to we isolate them and/or talk about them?
The first question is often answered by distinguishing between two
kinds of structure; particular and general. Isaacson explains the distinc-
tion as follows:
The particularity of a particular structure consists in the fact
that all its exemplars are isomorphic to each other. The gen-
erality of a general structure consists in the fact that its var-
ious exemplars need not be, and in general are not, isomor-
phic to each other. ([Isaacson, 2011], p. 21)
Exactly what different branches of mathematics have an underly-
ing ‘particular structure’ is a contentious issue (we discuss this later).
However, almost everyone agrees that we can talk about various kinds
of finite particular structure (e.g. the structure of the number ten un-
der the less-than relation). Normally it is assumed that most of our
1A good example here is Shapiro:
For our first (or second) approximation, then, pure mathematics is the
study of structures, independently of whether they are exemplified in
the physical realm, or in any realm for that matter. ([Shapiro, 1997], p.
75)
Examples can be multiplied (e.g. [Resnik, 1997], [Hellman, 1996]). See
[Reck and Schiemer, 2019] for a survey.
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arithmetical talk is concerned with a particular structure; the standard
model for arithmetic.2
General structures, by contrast, are not determined up to isomor-
phism. Examples of these include groups, rings, and fields. For exam-
ple the group of symmetries on a triangle and the group of integers
both possess the general structure of being a group, but the former is
finite where the latter is infinite.
It is a somewhat controversial question as to whether these two
kinds of structure are of the same ontological kind or not, since par-
ticular structures seem more fundamental than general structures, in
the sense that the latter are properties that the former can possess. We
speak, for example, of the particular structure of the integers exemplify-
ing the ring structure or the particular structure of the natural numbers
under addition exemplifying the general structure of a monoid.3 Still
more concrete are the systems exemplifying particular structures. For
example, the face of the clock on my wall (with the usual operations
of addition) is a system exemplifying the particular structure of the in-
tegers mod 12, which in turn exemplifies the general group structure.
The second question (how we isolate and talk about the different
kinds of structure) is then easy in the case of general structures for
the Weak Structuralist; she can simply state the properties she is inter-
ested in for some general structure, and in doing so talks about any
particular structures and/or systems that exemplify these properties.
The question is harder for particular structures, since here there is the
additional challenge of convincing ourselves that we have isolated a
structurally unique entity (at least up to isomorphism4).
One way of tackling the question of when we have isolated a par-
ticular structure can be derived from the work of Kreisel5, and has
been taken up subsequently by Isaacson6. They suggest that we have
a process of informal rigour by which we obtain mathematical under-
standing and isolate different particular structures. The rough idea
2See [Hamkins, 2012b] for a dissenting voice that we discuss a bit later.
3Isaacson (in [Isaacson, 2011]) seems to take the view that particular structures
are somehow more fundamental, referring to a general structure with no particu-
lar instances as “vacuous” (p. 25). Similar remarks can be found in [Leitgeb, 2020],
where unlabelled graphs are taken as the particular ‘ground level’ structures, and
general structures are viewed as higher-order properties or classes of particular
structures.
4There is a substantial discussion around whether isomorphism is too strong,
and perhaps something weaker like definitional equivalence would be better. We set
aside this issue for now, things are complicated enough without opening that can of




(which I discuss in more detail below) is that we isolate a particular
structure by becoming more rigorous about a topic, and manifest this
rigour by providing a categorical axiomatisation.
A categorical axiomatisation is a set of axiomsTwhich determines
a unique model up to isomorphism (i.e. any two models of T are
isomorphic). Where categoricity is concerned, one must talk about
different logics. The insight provided by Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theo-
rem shows that first-order logic cannot provide categorical axiomati-
sations for infinite structures. It is in the work of Resnik (in particular
[Resnik, 1997]) where we find a notion of structural relativity; the idea
that the structure isolated for different parts of mathematics depends
on the logical resources we consider.
This paper brings together these ideas focussing on set theory as a
case study. We argue for the following claims:
1. We have good reason to doubt that we are fully informally rigor-
ous about set theory. Rather our level of informal rigour is partial.
2. Given this level of informal rigour, it is reasonable to hold that
our set-theoretic thought might be axiomatised in a logic stronger
than first-order, but weaker than second-order.
3. This shows that the usual distinction between particular and gen-
eral structures corresponding to different concepts is more fine-
grained than we might have initially thought. There are concepts
that correspond to intentionally general structures in that the con-
cept is designed to talk about many non-isomorphic structures.
Other concepts correspond to unintentionally general structures,
where we do not intend for the structure we talk about to be gen-
eral, yet we do not pin down a particular structure with our dis-
course.
Here’s the plan: §1 examines the notion of informal rigour as it ap-
pears in Kreisel’s 1967 paper and how it relates to the problem of the
Continuum Hypothesis. §2 presents three possible interpretations of
informal rigour; a quasi-idealist one, a weakly platonistic one, and a
strongly platonistic one (we’ll see shortly what I mean by these terms).
§3 presents the idea of structural relativity. §4 then examines differ-
ent states we may be in with respect to informal rigour, and exam-
ines some possibilities for axiomatisations of our thought. §5 exam-
ines some objections and replies. Finally §6 concludes with some open
questions.
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1 Informal rigour and the Continuum Hypoth-
esis
In this section we explain informal rigour and the idea that it might be
used to show the existence of particular structures. We’ll do this by
explaining Kreisel’s rough idea, and then formulating a more precise
thesis (that particular structures are determined via informal rigour)
at the end of the section. We’ll also explain how Kreisel thought that
his account of informal rigour leads to a determinate truth value for
the Continuum Hypothesis.7
Kreisel (in [Kreisel, 1967]) discusses the notion of informal rigour.
This represents a development of the idea that we work mathemati-
cally simply by examining our intuitive notions and laying down ax-
ioms for them. Kreisel expands this a little, saying that the process is
not quite so simple, but we can (by successively becoming more clear
about a mathematical subject matter) come to successful axiomatisa-
tions for intuitive notions. He writes:
Informal rigour wants (i) to make this analysis as precise as
possible (with the means available), in particular to elimi-
nate doubtful properties of the intuitive notions when draw-
ing conclusions about them; and (ii) to extend this analysis,
in particular not to leave undecided questions which can be
decided by full use of evident properties of these intuitive
notions. ([Kreisel, 1967], pp. 138–139)
Kreisel’s point is well-taken, and the history of mathematics is re-
plete with notions that were initially unclear but slowly came to be
made precise through development and reflection. Examples include
ideas of completeness and denseness (initially these were confused),
the notion of derivative (we will discuss this later in §5), Cantor’s anal-
ysis of the size of sets, and indeed the notion of set itself was gradu-
ally made clearer. However, whilst Kreisel’s remarks are suggestive,
7Interestingly, it certainly seems like Kreisel held something like the Weak Struc-
turalism. For example, he writes:
if one thinks of the axioms as conditions on mathematical objects, i.e. on
the structures which satisfy the axioms considered, these axioms make
a selection among the basic objects; they do not tell us what the basic
objects are. ([Kreisel, 1967], p. 165, emphasis original)
Whilst the extent to which Kreisel really was a structuralist (rather than merely
provided resources useful to structuralism) is certainly an interesting question, I lack
the space to address it fully here.
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he does not provide a detailed account of exactly what informal rigour
is like. Largely speaking, he takes it for granted that we know what it
is when we see it (at least as far as his [Kreisel, 1967] is concerned).
Despite this, we can make some progress by examining specific
questions:
(1.) What are the targets of informal rigour?8
(2.) How do we achieve informal rigour?
(3.) What are the consequences of informal rigour?
For (1.) some taxonomy will be useful. When we talk about math-
ematical structure, there are several important aspects:
(a) The concepts we employ in thinking about mathematics (I’ll refer
to these using C, C0, C1, ... etc.).9
(b) The mathematised natural language(s) we use when speaking about
structure(s). We will refer to these as discourses, and denote them
by (D,D0,D1, ...).
(c) Different formal mathematical theories (T, T0,T1, ...).
(d) Different mathematical structures, both particular and general (S,
S0, S1, ...).
(e) Different systems exemplifying structures, which for convenience
we’ll assume are model-theoretic structures (M,M0,M1, ...).
It is important to be clear about these distinctions if we are to pro-
vide a fully worked-out account on Kreisel’s behalf. Nowhere is he
fully explicit about the matter, but his discussion (and a reasonable
understanding of the notion) seems to suggest that informal rigour
concerns how the concepts underlying discourses can be refined in
coming to be precise about structures. Mathematical practice involves
communicating in a mathematised natural language, and how we in-
terpret this language is contingent upon the concepts being employed.
8I thank Verena Wagner for pressing this question in discussion.
9 Juliette Kennedy suggests that talk of concepts is too unclear, and we would be
better off eliminating this language altogether. I am somewhat sympathetic to this
position, and certainly feel that it can sometimes muddy the waters. Despite this,
language of this kind is useful for setting up the debate, and I’m happy to use it
here. For the reader who has doubt about the coherence of concept-talk, I suggest
that they read all mention of concepts as shorthand for their favourite account of
what the constituents of thoughts are.
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For example, the interpretation we ascribe to a computer scientist us-
ing the term “set” (in a context where we can have non-well-founded
‘sets’) is different from the interpretation we would ascribe to a set
theorist working in some extension of ZFC. This isn’t a contradic-
tion; they are simply employing different concepts with their use of
language and mean different things with their usage of the term “set”.
Correspondingly, there are different ways we could systematise or rep-
resent their language formally, and in turn different interpretations of
this formal language. At the bottom level, the formal theories repre-
senting different pieces of mathematised language can be interpreted
(contingent on the concepts employed) as about different kinds of struc-
ture.
In the rest of the paper, we will assume that the main target of in-
formal rigour is the concepts we employ when speaking or writing in
mathematical language (i.e. discourses). Perhaps there is more to be
said here, but I’m happy to make this assumption for the purposes of
the paper.
With the targets and rough idea of informal rigour in play, we can
begin to address (2.) How do we achieve informal rigour? Kreisel
provides four examples10, key to each is the idea that we develop in-
formal rigour concerning a concept via working with it in practice.
In this way we can develop our intuitions, and come to be rigorous
about a notion. This rigour can then be formally codified. Our inter-
est will be especially in his remarks about the difference between the
independence of the Parallels Postulate from the second-order axioms
of geometry, and the independence of CH from the axioms of ZFC.
Discussing Zermelo’s isolation of the axioms of ZFC2,11. Kreisel
discusses the following:
Theorem (Zermelo-Shepherdson12). LetM andN be models of ZFC2.
Then either:
10These include: (I) analysing the difference between independence results, such
as the parallels axiom in geometry and the independence of CH in set theory (the
focus of this paper), (II) the relation between intuitive consequence and syntac-
tic/semantic consequence (here he gives his famous ‘squeezing’ argument, arguing
that the informal notion of consequence can be squeezed between the formal classes
of a syntactic derivation in first-order logic and semantic consequence in first-order
logic), (III) Brouwer’s ‘empirical’ propositions, and (IV) showing that the use of cer-
tain models is a conservative extension of arithmetic.
11ZFC2 denotes second-order Zermelo-Fraenkel Set Theory with the Axiom of
Choice.
12[Shepherdson, 1951], [Shepherdson, 1952], and [Shepherdson, 1953] take
[Zermelo, 1930]’s sketch and make it substantially more rigorous.
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1. M and N are isomorphic.
2. M is isomorphic to proper initial segment of N, of the form Vκ
for inaccessible κ.
3. N is isomorphic to proper initial segment of M, of the form Vκ
for inaccessible κ.
The core point is the following; whilst there is no13 full categoric-
ity theorem for second-order set theory ZFC2, there is for initial seg-
ments. In particular, many versions of ZFC2 with a specific bound on
the number of large cardinals (e.g. “There are no inaccessible cardi-
nals” or “There are exactly five inaccessible cardinals”) are categorical.
Concerning this theorem, Kreisel writes:
the actual formulation of axioms played an auxiliary rather
than basic role in Zermelo’s work: the intuitive analysis of
the crude mixture of notions, namely the description of the
type structure, led to the good axioms: these constitute a
record, not the instruments of clarification. ([Kreisel, 1967],
p. 145)
Abstractly speaking, Kreisel’s position might then be described as
follows. We begin to work with an informal concept C, employing
it in some mathematical discourse D. Gradually we begin to become
clearer about D and C via using them in practice, and developing our
intuitions about the subject. Once we are eventually clear about the
right concept C 1 underlying D (it is at least possible that C 1 “ C here),
we will have obtained sufficient precision to lay down a theory T for
C 1, which is categorical in that any systemM |ù T is isomorphic to any
other systemM1 |ù T. In this way, by employing our concept C 1 and
using T, we have determined a particular structure S up to isomor-
phism. In the case of set theory, we can think of the development of
the idea of cumulative hierarchy and iterative conception of set after 1900
as yielding some particular set-theoretic structures by 1930 when Zer-
melo gave his axiomatisation.
This brings us on to (3.) What are the consequences of informal
rigour? Our focus will be how informal rigour affects our attitude to
the truth value of CH. Key here is the Zermelo-Shepherdson quasi-
categoricity theorem: In this way given an interpretation of the second-
order variables (this will be important later), ZFC2 determines several
13Without further meta-theoretic assumptions. See [McGee, 1997] for a full cate-
goricity result using urelements.
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particular structures corresponding to initial segments of the cumula-
tive hierarchy.
Kreisel took this to show that our talk concerning the cumulative
hierarchy, as axiomatised by ZFC2, was unambiguous. He writes:
Denying the (alleged) bifurcation or multifurcation of our
notion of set of the cumulative hierarchy is nothing else but
asserting the properties of our intuitive conception of the
cumulative type-structure mentioned above. ([Kreisel, 1967],
pp. 144–145)
Why is this significant for CH? Well, since the truth value of CH is
settled by Vω`2 (well below the least inaccessible) and if we think that
all models of ZFC2 agree up to the first inaccessible (by the Zermelo-
Shepherdson quasi-categoricity theorem), then CH has the same truth-
value in all particular structures meeting our informally rigorous con-
cept of set (so the thinking goes). This, as Kreisel points out, makes
the independence of CH from set-theoretic axioms markedly different
from the independence of the Parallels Postulate (PP) from the axioms
of geometry; PP can have different truth-values across models of the
second-order axioms of geometry (once we fix upon some interpreta-
tion of the second-order variables), whereas CH has the same truth
value in all models of ZFC2 with the same interpretation of the range
of second-order quantifiers.
To make the state of the dialectic precise, and given the difficulty
of interpreting Kreisel, it is worth pulling out the key moving parts of
our interpretation of Kreisel’s presentation:
(Assumption of Informal Rigour) A mathematical discourse
D determines a particular structure S when we are infor-
mally rigorous in employing the relevant concept C corre-
sponding to D, and this informal rigour can be manifested
in a categorical axiomatisationT of C such that for any sys-
tems M and M1 exemplifying S, both M and M1 satisfy T
and are isomorphic.
(Manifestation Thesis) We become informally rigorous about
a concept C not by using an axiomatisation to clarify it, but
rather through developing our mathematical understand-
ing of C by working with it in practice. This understanding
can then be manifested by a categorical axiomatisationT. (In
other words, the existence of a categorical axiomatisation is
necessary for us to have informal rigour.)
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(Segment Particularity Thesis) We are informally rigorous
about the concept cumulative type structure below the first
inaccessible, and this concept is axiomatised by the theory
ZFC2 + “There are no inaccessible cardinals” and deter-
mines a particular structure.
(CH-Determinateness Thesis) The concept cumulative type
structure suffices to determine CH.
(Difference Thesis) The kind of independence exhibited by
CH (relative to ZFC2) and PP (relative to the axioms of ge-
ometry) are of fundamentally different kinds.
In what follows, we shall take the Assumption of Informal Rigour
as an assumption (though we’ll discuss how to flesh it out in more
detail). This is just because I’m interested in exploring the idea; it’s
clearly a very controversial assumption! We’ll argue that the Segment
Particularity Thesis and CH-Determinateness Thesis are false (or, at the
very least, we have good reason to doubt them). We’ll then argue that
the Manifestation Thesis suggests that our thought is perhaps best ax-
iomatised by something weaker than ZFC2. We’ll also argue that the
Difference Thesis still holds true.
2 Three interpretations of informal rigour
In the last section, we saw some theses that one might extract from
Kreisel’s paper on informal rigour. In this section, I’ll present three
ways of interpreting this process of informal rigour that will be impor-
tant for later.
2.1 Isaacson’s Kreisel
One way of interpreting the process of informal rigour has been pro-
posed by Dan Isaacson (in [Isaacson, 2011]). There he seems to commit
himself to the Assumption of Informal Rigour in the following pas-
sage:
We achieve understanding of the notion of mathematical
structure not by axiomatizing the notion but by reflecting
on the development of mathematical practice by which par-
ticular mathematical structures come to be understood, the
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natural numbers, the euclidean [plane], the real numbers,
etc. how do we know that such structures exist? The ques-
tion is likely to be construed in such a way that it is a bad
question. There is nothing we can do to establish that par-
ticular mathematical structures exist apart from articulat-
ing a coherent conception of such a particular structure.
([Isaacson, 2011], p. 29)
as well as the Manifestation Thesis:
...if the mathematical community at some stage in the de-
velopment of mathematics has succeeded in becoming (in-
formally) clear about a particular mathematical structure,
this clarity can be made mathematically exact. Of course
by the general theorems that establish first-order languages
as incapable of characterizing infinite structures the math-
ematical specification of the structure about which we are
clear will be in a higher-order language, usually by means
of a full second-order language. Why must there be such
a characterization? Answer: if the clarity is genuine, there
must be a way to articulate it precisely. if there is no such
way, the seeming clarity must be illusory. ([Isaacson, 2011],
p. 39)
However, his interpretation of these notions is decidedly not objec-
tual in the platonistic sense of concerning mind-independent abstract
objects:
The basis of mathematics is conceptual and epistemolog-
ical, not ontological, and understanding particular math-
ematical structures is prior to axiomatic characterization.
When such a resulting axiomatization is categorical, a par-
ticular mathematical structure is established. Particular math-
ematical structures are not mathematical objects. They are
characterizations. ([Isaacson, 2011], p.38, my emphasis)
So, for Isaacson, the process of informal rigour can be understood
as a mind-dependent activity in some sense. The process informal rigour
should not be understood as one where we pick out some pre-existing
ontological objects, but rather as the determination of a particular struc-
ture using our thought and language, one that does not exist in ad-
vance of our characterising activity (in this sense, his view is quasi-
idealist). This precision in our concept is then manifested by a categori-
cal axiomatisation T.
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Isaacson’s claim that particular structures just are characterisations
is a little puzzling; the claim that particular structures are literally nu-
merically identical with theories (i.e. characterisations) has the whiff
of a category mistake about it. However, it serves to show further
how we might think of informal rigour as a process of mathematical
claims being dependent upon our epistemological and conceptual ac-
tivity, rather than any independently existing structural domain.
Isaacson’s version of informal rigour does not commit him to an
‘anything goes’ version of conventionalism. First, given some em-
ployed concepts about which we are informally rigorous, there can
be objective facts about what follows from that concept.14 This is visi-
ble from Isaacson’s endorsement of the CH-Determinateness Thesis.15
Moreover, we are able to fix infinitely many structures in this way.16
For example, the categoricity of the natural numbers establishes in-
finitely many particular structures, e.g. the structure exemplified by
pn,ăq for any chosen n. Since it is unclear whether or not Kreisel
would have accepted Isaacson’s interpretation, I shall refer to a char-
acter I call ‘Isaacson’s Kreisel’ as a proponent of this view of informal
rigour.
14A good question, one we do not have space to address here, is how Isaacson’s
version of Kreisel relates to [Ferreiro´s, 2016]’s account of mathematics as invention
cum discovery.
15He writes:
...the independence of the continuum hypothesis does not establish the
existence of a multiplicity of set theories. in a sense made precise and
established by the use of second-order logic, there is only one set theory
of the continuum. it remains an open question whether in that set the-
ory there is an infinite subset of the power set of the natural numbers
that is not equinumerous with the whole power set. ([Isaacson, 2011],
pp. 48–49)
16He writes:
While indeed there are up to any given moment of course only finitely
many theorems establishing categorical characterizations of structures,
e.g. of the natural numbers, the real and complex numbers, the eu-
clidean plane, the cumulative hierarchy of sets up to a particular or-
dinal, one such theorem may establish categorical characterization of
infinitely many particular substructures. ([Isaacson, 2011], p. 38)
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2.2 Weak Kreiselian Platonism
Isaacson’s Kreisel represents a version of informal rigour which feeds
into a quite anthropocentric characterisation of the notion of structure.
On his characterisation, informal rigour concerning the concepts em-
ployed in a discourse is constitutive of establishing the relevant struc-
ture in question.
Instead, we might have a more platonistic conception of informal
rigour. One might instead hold that structures are objects of some
kind, and there are many (mind-independent) abstract concepts we
can employ in talking about those structures.
Given a discourse D and employment of a concept C0 underlying
this discourse,17 informal rigour on this picture consists of a successive
narrowing down and improvement of the conceptC0. IfC0 does not al-
ready determine some particular structure S, this may then necessitate
moving to a sharper concept C1 to underwrite D. Once we have be-
come sufficiently informally rigorous about the concept underlying D
(this might take several iterations of conceptual refinement) and have
pinned down some independent structure S with some conceptC2, we
are then able to provide our categorical axiomatisation T correspond-
ing to C2.18
In many ways, at a practical level, the Weak Kreiselian Platonist
and Isaacson’s Kreisel have much in common. They both think that
mathematics depends in some way on us, the Weak Kreselian Platon-
ist because the ways we refine our concepts are presumably dependent
upon us (even though they may be constrained), and Kreisel’s Isaac-
son because mathematical structures are determined by our activity.
They differ in that the Kreselian Platonist thinks that the structures
we talk about, and plausibly the concepts employ, are independent of
us and informal rigour allows us to make a selection between them.
Isaacson’s Kreisel, on the other hand, thinks that the structures are de-
termined by us, rather than discovered.
17Of course, there may be more than one concept involved, in which case we
might have to consider a concepts C0, ...,Cα instead. I suppress this complication;
nothing in my arguments hangs on there being just one concept or many.
18One question, that we shall leave as an open question at the end of the paper,
is how we should understand this process of conceptual refinement. For example:
Do the concepts stay the same, or do they change when we refine our concepts? For
the purposes of discussing informal rigour and whether or not CH is determinate,
I’m not sure this matters so much, but for the future development of set theory (and
mathematics more generally) we might wonder how conceptual refinement figures
in debates about, for example, the temporal continuity of subject matter in math-
ematics. I am grateful to Chris Scambler for many hours of interesting discussion
here.
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2.3 Strong Kreiselian Platonism19
There is a stronger version of Kreiselian Platonism. The key additional
assumption is the following:
(Set-Theoretic Uniqueness) There is one and only one cor-
rect concept C for discourse that is sufficiently ‘set-like’ (i.e.
concerns extensional objects), and it is possible for us to
have informal rigour about C. Informal rigour should be
understood as a way of approximating C ever more closely.
So, for the Strong Kreiselian Platonist, it is not only the case that we
may refine concepts in coming to be informally rigorous but also that
we tend towards exactly one such way of filling out the concept in the
case of set theory.
We then have three figures; Isaacson’s Kreisel, the Weak Kreiselian
Platonist, and the Strong Kreiselian Platonist. We shall argue that for
Isaacson’s Kreisel and the Weak Kreiselian Platonist, the status of the
informal rigour of the universe of sets (and in particular the Contin-
uum Hypothesis) is questionable. The Strong Kreiselian Platonist can
hold on to the full informal rigour of the set concept up to a certain
level, but we will argue that their position has some implausible con-
sequences (even if it is strictly speaking coherent).
3 Structural relativity
We are now at a point where we have said a little more about how we
might fill out an account of informal rigour, and provided some pos-
sible philosophical interpretations of the notion. For the purposes of
our arguments in §4 and interpreting our own set-theoretic discourse,
it will be useful to set up the idea of structural relativity.
Structural relativity is the idea that the structure isolated by a par-
ticular piece of mathematical discourse is contingent upon the logic
used to underwrite it. It is discussed explicitly by [Resnik, 1997]:
In thinking about formulating a theory of structures we
must take into account a phenomenon I will call structural
relativity, the structures we can discern and describe are
a function of the background devices we have available
19I am grateful to Leon Horsten for suggesting this interpretation, and Daniel
Kuby for some additional discussion led me to realise that I also needed to consider
the weaker form of Kreiselian Platonism as discussed in the last subsection.
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for depicting structures...This relativity arises whether we
think of patterns and structures as a kind of mould, format,
or stencil for producing instances, or as whatever remains
invariant when we apply a certain kind of transformation,
or as an equivalence class or type associated with some
equivalence relation. The structures we recognize will be
relative to our devices for specifying forms, or transforma-
tions or equivalence relations. ([Resnik, 1997], p. 250)
The idea then for Resnik, is that the kind of structures we can talk
about can vary contingent upon the logical resources we employ. For
the same mathematical discourseD, we might pick many different for-
mal theories to underwrite it, and many different kinds of structure
might be isolated by these different concepts. For example, he writes:
If we limit ourselves to describing structures as the models
of various first-order schemata, then the types of structures
we will define will be like the more coarse-grained ones fre-
quently found in abstract algebra. Here one starts by defin-
ing a type of structure such as a group, a ring, or a lattice
with the intention of allowing for many non-isomorphic ex-
amples of the same type. As a result most of our structural
descriptions will fail to be categorical. On the other hand,
using second-order schemata, we can formulate categori-
cal descriptions of the structures studied by (second-order)
number theory, Euclidean geometry and analysis, and cat-
egorical extensions of [ZFC2] that are considered powerful
enough for most mathematical needs.
Thus, depending upon our logical resources, we might in-
troduce:
The First-Order Natural Number Structure,
The Second-Order Natural Number Structure,
The First-Order Structure of the Reals,
The Second-Order Structure of the Reals,
and so on.
By going to stronger logics we get more fine grained ver-
sions of the various structures. ([Resnik, 1997], p. 252)
So, for example, we can consider our talk about natural numbers
as either formalised in first-order Peano Arithmetic (PA), or in second-
order Peano Arithmetic (PA2). The latter axiomatisation corresponds
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(on the usual understanding) to the particular structure of the standard
model of natural numbers, the former on the other hand is a general
structure that is true both on the standard model (where, presumably,
ConpPAq holds), but also can be true in non-isomorphic non-standard
models (where, for example,  ConpPAq can hold).
The above passage is fairly indicative of what seems to be a (false)
dichotomy underlying parts of the literature; we are presented with
the choice between either using first-order resources (where almost
nothing is categorical, only finite structures) or full second-order re-
sources (where an enormous amount of our mathematical talk is fully
categorical).20 This dichotomy does not adequately reflect the fact that
in mathematical logic we have a wide range of logics intermediate be-
tween first-order and second-order. The properties of these logics are
well-understood21, and it is surprising that they have not been con-
sidered in detail in the context of structural relativity. This is not to
say that authors (including Resnik) intend this false dichotomy, just
that largely speaking in the structuralist literature these are the two
options proffered.
Admitting intermediate logics into interpretations of structural rel-
ativity opens up a host of possibilities. Once we free ourselves of the
binary choice between first- and second-order resources, we have the
option of considering many different formal theories for underwriting
a discourse. There is a wide variety of options here, including increas-
ing our resources beyond first-order with certain operators (e.g. an-
cestral logic) or alternatively allowing infinitary conjunctions or quan-
tifier alternations. Since we will be interested here in theories that we
can use in manifesting informal rigour, we set aside the use of infini-
tary resources. In the next section, we shall see how versions of set
theory incorporating structural relativity given by weak second-order
logic and quasi-weak second-order logic correspond to two natural
positions about of informal rigour concerning the cumulative hierar-
chy.
20Isaacson, for example, writes:
As Shapiro and others have long noted, the language in which to articu-
late our understanding of particular mathematical structures is second-
order... ([Isaacson, 2011], p.28)
21See, for example, [Shapiro, 1991] (Ch. 9) or [Shapiro, 2001].
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4 The concept of set, degrees of informal rigour,
and structural relativity
We are now in a position where:
(1.) Informal rigour in the concepts underlying a discourse is mani-
fested by axiomatisations that are categorical.
(2.) We have three different ways of interpreting informal rigour, via
Isaacson’s Kreisel, Weak Kreiselian Platonism, and Strong Kreiselian
Platonism.
(3.) Structural relativity may come in to play, whereby the kinds of
structures we isolate are contingent upon the background logic
we use.
In this section, I’ll consider some examples that show how we might
not be fully informally rigorous about our set-theoretic discourse and
set concept. I’ll then argue that there should be a degree of structural
relativity involved in the axiomatisation of our thought concerning
sets. Nonetheless, I shall argue that we are (and have been) partially
informally rigorous, and our discourse about portions of the hierarchy
can be understood as about particular structures. To do this, I’ll look
historically at Mirimanoff’s thought concerning the Axiom of Founda-
tion, before considering our own axiomatisation of set theory in terms
of ZFC and our possible attitudes to CH.
In order to make out my conclusions, it will be useful first to anal-
yse in a little more detail what we might expect from an account of
informal rigour. Important for Kreisel’s notion is that our concept of
set, and the informal rigour we have about it, is a source for axioms.
He writes:
What one means here is that the intuitive notion of the cu-
mulative type structure provides a coherent source of ax-
ioms; our understanding is sufficient to avoid an endless
string of ambiguities to be resolved by further basic dis-
tinctions...22 ([Kreisel, 1967], p. 144)
Isaacson agrees, at least insofar as interpretation of Kreisel goes:
22Kreisel continues:“...like the distinction above between abstract properties and
sets of something.”, speaking about the distinction between intensional entities and
sets (this intensionality he seems to diagnose as the source of the class-theoretic para-
doxes). Since this diagnosis is rather controversial, I’ll set it aside here.
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In order actually to solve the continuum problem a formal-
izable derivation from axioms, of the kind which Cohen
and Go¨del’s results show not to exist from the first-order
axioms of ZF, must be found. This means that new axioms
are required. ([Isaacson, 2011], p. 16)
My point is the following: If we are informally rigorous about a dis-
course D and the concepts underlying it, and hence have determined
a particular structure, we can expect the use of these concepts as a
“coherent source of axioms” not to lead us in radically different direc-
tions. Of course, it is possible to have beliefs about a structure that turn
out to be false (as when I believe an eventually false conjecture), but it
should not be the case that radically different concepts, with radically
different theories and consequences are legitimate ways of refining our
current concepts. We therefore identify the following:
(Modal Definiteness Assumption.) (MDA) If we are infor-
mally rigorous about a mathematical discourse D, using a
concept C0, then there should not be two (or more) legiti-
mate ways of refining C0 (to some C1 and C2) such that C1
motivates a theory T1 and C2 motivates a theory T2 such
that T1 and T2 are inconsistent with one another.23
The Modal Definiteness Assumption is highly plausible. If our
discourse and concepts already determine a particular structure (via
informal rigour) then there should not be equally legitimate ways of
sharpening our concepts that are inconsistent with one another, since
the truth value of all claims in the discourse are already set by this
structure. Therefore one of the two theories has to be false, and one
of the two concept-schemes is not legitimate.24 Of course, what con-
stitutes a ‘legitimate’ extension is going to be something of debate. I
hope the examples I provide from the philosophy of set theory will
make it clear that there are such sharpenings, and hence by MDA we
are not informally rigorous about our concept of set. However, let us
first see how the MDA might play out in a positive case where we do
take ourselves to have informal rigour.
23Many thanks to Daniela Schuster for pressing me to become clearer about my
formulation of the MDA.
24If you’re familiar with debates in the philosophy of set theory, you might al-
ready see where I’m going here.
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4.1 The Radical Relativist
Suppose we believe that our discourse about the natural numbers,
underwritten by our concept of natural number, is informally rigor-
ous and this informal rigour is manifested by PA2 and the attendant
Dedekind-categoricity theorem. Along comes the Radical Relativist
who says to us: You cannot be informally rigorous about arithmetic,
since there are legitimate consistent extensions PA2 ` ConpPA2q and
PA2` ConpPAq2 ofPA that are inconsistent with one another. What
should are reaction be?
Our response should be the following: Of course these extensions
are consistent, but one is clearly legitimate where the other is not. In
particular, PA2 ` ConpPAq2 can only be true in models that are non-
standard, not only in their interpretation of the second-order variables,
but also have consequences that do not accord with our concept of nat-
ural number. For example, we can see that such models have numbers
n˚, such that for any particular standard natural number n given to
me, n˚ is greater than n. So it is simply not true that PA2 ` ConpPA2q
and PA2 `  ConpPA2q are both legitimate extensions of PA2, at least
insofar as axiomatising our concepts and thought concerning the par-
ticular structure of natural numbers is concerned.
Moreover, there is no categoricity theorem for the theoryPA2` ConpPA2q,
and indeed it can have highly non-isomorphic models. In fact, there
are continuum-many distinct consistent completions ofPA2, and hence
continuum-many countable models of PA2.25 So there can be no cate-
goricity theorem for this theory, and hence no informal rigour.
This will provide a contrast case for our main two examples; ex-
amining the historical situation with respect to Miramanoff and the
Axiom of Foundation, and our contemporary situation with respect to
set theory, and CH. First, however, I want to consider a case that is not
quite as extreme as the Radical Relativist, on which the natural num-
bers are determinate, but nonetheless we may have worries about our
informal rigour concerning the iterative conception of set.
4.2 The Recursive Iterabilist
We now consider a slightly different situation, one in which we have
agents whose thought is best axiomatised by a version of set theory
25This follows just by taking a Henkin interpretation of the second-order quan-
tifiers of PA2 over a countable model of any consistent completion of PA. See
[Kaye, 1991] for an extensive treatment of non-standard models ofPA. For the time-
pressed reader [Hamkins, 2012a] provides a quick way of seeing the result for PA.
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intermediate between first and second-orderZFC. This is not the main
focus of our points (we are more concerned with the case of CH), but it
is an interesting possibility and serves as a warm-up.
Suppose that one accepts first-order logic and the the iterative con-
ception as a conceptual idea, and hence regards ZFC as a (probably)
consistent theory worthy of study, but has extreme reservations about
informal rigour concerning the notions of arbitrary subset and arbi-
trary well-order. Instead, one thinks that we can only be informally
rigorous about things that are recursively defined, and one thinks that
it’s possible that our thinking might not be informally rigorous and
fail to determine particular structures at large infinite ordinals. Call
this character the Recursive Iterabilist.
To make our points (here and later) we first need to set up some
terminology. Two background logics will be of special interest for us:26
Definition. Weak second-order logic is the logic in which we allow the
same vocabulary as second-order logic L 2K (where K are the non-
logical symbols) but with function variables removed.
Its semantics is given by letting the second-order quantifiers range
over finite relations. Let M be a model with domain M . We define a
finite assignment s on M as assignment s that assigns a member of M
to each first-order variable, and a finite n-place relation on M to each
n-place relation variable. Satisfaction is defined in the usual manner
for the first-order connectives and quantifiers, and second-order quan-
tification is handled by the clause:
M, s |ù @Xφ iff for every finite assignment s1 that agrees
with s (except possibly at X),M, s1 |ù φ.
The instances of comprehension DX@ypXpyq Ø φpyqq which are
valid on a structure M are those where the extension of φ is finite in
M.
ZFC2W is the theory ZFC2 with function variables removed from
the vocabulary and the underlying semantics given by weak second-
order logic.
26The presentations given here are heavily indebted to Stewart Shapiro’s
[Shapiro, 2001].
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Definition. Quasi-Weak Second-Order Logic has the same formulas as
full second-order logic, but in the semantics each variable assignment
assigns countable relations to the variables (this is similar to weak
second-order logic, where we allow countable relations instead of fi-
nite ones). So @Xφ holds iff for all countable X , φ holds.
Let ZFC2QW be set theory formulated in quasi-weak second-order
logic with instances of the replacement scheme for each formula of the
quasi-weak second-order language.
It is useful to identify some facts off the bat:27
Fact. Both ZFC2QW and ZFC2W are able to characterise categorically
the natural numbers (i.e. any two models of ZFC2QW and ZFC2W
always have the standard natural numbers as their standard model
of arithmetic, and indeed any two models of PA2 with the standard
semantics within a model of ZFC2QW or ZFC2W are isomorphic).28
The same goes for the rational numbers.29
Fact. ZFC2QW is able to characterise the theory of real analysis up to
isomorphism30, ZFC2W cannot.31
Fact. ZFC2QW is able to characterise the notion of well-foundedness,
that is, all models of ZFC2QW are well-founded.32
Fact. ZFC2W is not able to characterise the notion of well-foundedness
(i.e. there are models of ZFC2W with a non-well-founded membership
27See [Shapiro, 2001] for discussion of these results.
28This is because we can characterise the notion of finiteness in both Quasi-Weak
and Weak Second-Order Logic. See [Shapiro, 2001], p. 161, and Theorem 16 and
Corollary 17 on p. 162.
29This is because we can characterise the notion of minimal closure in the two log-
ics, and the rational numbers can be characterised up to isomorphism as an infinite
field arising from the minimal closure of t1u under the field operations and their
inverses. See [Shapiro, 2001], p. 161.
30This is because we can characterise the completeness principle for the reals in
ZFC2QW . See [Shapiro, 1991], pp. 164–165.
31Since the Lo¨wenheim number of Weak Second-Order Logic is ℵ0. See
[Shapiro, 2001], pp. 161–162.
32Assuming Choice in the meta-theory, the fact that every countable class is a set
in a model of ZFC2QW ensures this. See [Shapiro, 1991], p. 165.
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relation).33
So, we have several logics and versions of ZFC-like set theory ren-
dered in them in view. Now, the Recursive Iterabilist will hold that
we are informally rigorous about the natural numbers and rational
numbers, but have grave worries about our informal rigour concern-
ing the iterative conception in general.34 In this case, we might think
that our thought about ZFC-based set theory and the concept of cu-
mulative type structure is best axiomatised by ZFC2W . There we are
able to identify the rational and natural numbers up to isomorphism,
but the real numbers cannot be so identified, and non-recursive well-
orderings (e.g. ωCK1 ) can not be characterised up to isomorphism.35
If you are a Recursive Iterabilist, you are thus likely to hold that
our talk about sets is only partially informally rigorous, and this level
of partial informal rigour is manifested in ZFC2W . We thus have a
coherent position on which a level of informal rigour is manifested in
a logic stronger than first-order but weaker than second-order.
Of course the natural point to make here is that this is just a case
where the Recursive Iterabilist and the believer in the CH-Determinateness
assumption have a clash of intuitions. There is nothing in the example
as I have presented it that might convince someone who believes in the
CH-Determinateness Assumption on the basis of the quasi-categoricty
of ZFC2 to re-evaluate their position. We will discuss the place of the
quasi-categoricity theorem later (§5), for now we just note that the ex-
ample as presented shows that we can have a coherent position on
which our reasoning is axiomatised by a set theory couched in a logic
intermediate between first- and second-order.
4.3 Miramanoff’s Informal Rigour
The following example will show that there are plausibly actual ex-
amples in which agents were not informally rigorous about set the-
ory (and, at the very least, such examples are possible). However, we
might nonetheless think that substantial parts of mathematics were in-
formally rigorous, and as such we had partial informal rigour in the
notion of set. We’ll see, however, that the example is more analogous
to PP than CH (the latter we consider in §4.4).
33This is because there is a natural equivalence between being a model of ZFC2W
and being an ω-model of ZFC (see [Shapiro, 1991], p. 162, Corollary 17) and there
are non-well-founded ω-models of ZFC.
34Solomon Feferman’s views (for example in [Feferman et al., 2000]) are not far
from this position.
35See here [Shapiro, 1991], p. 163.
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In 1917, Dimitry Mirimanoff wrote a paper entitled ‘Les antinomies
de Russell et de Burali-Forti et le proble`me fondamental de la the´orie
des ensembles’. In this paper, he considers Russell’s Paradox and the
Burali-Forti Paradox, and identifies two kinds of sets; the ‘ordinary’
ones and the ‘extraordinary’ ones. These were to be differentiated by
whether or not they contain infinite descending sequences of mem-
bership; the ordinary ones do not (in current terminology: they have
a well-founded membership relation) and the extraordinary ones do
(in current terminology: they have a non-well-founded membership
relation):
I will say that a set is ordinary just in case it gives rise to
finite descents, I will say that it is extraordinary when among
its descents are some that are infinite. ([Mirimanoff, 1917],
p. 42, my translation)36
It is clear that Mirimanoff (in [Mirimanoff, 1917]) was undecided
about whether the Axiom of Foundation was a basic principle about
sets. It is also fairly clear, we think, that he was not fully informally
rigorous about set theory. To see this, it suffices to consider what the-
ory might have underwritten his thinking about sets, and show that
there are different legitimate extensions that are inconsistent with one
another.
Clearly Mirimanoff thought that sets were extensional and he ex-
plicitly discusses the axioms of pairing and union, as well as replace-
ment. For the purposes of our discussion, let us assume that he was
clear that his notion of set supported at least the first-order axioms
of ZF without the Axiom of Foundation. (It doesn’t matter so much
whether or not these were actually Mirimanoff’s views, as long as this
character is at least possible it shows the kinds of situations that are
compatible with informal rigour in set theory.)
Can Mirimanoff’s level of informal rigour support more? Is he in-
formally rigorous about the Axiom of Foundation? We answer this
negatively using the Modal Definiteness Assumption. We argue that
there are legitimate extensions of Mirimanoff’s concept that support
inconsistent theories of sets (namely ZF and ZF`“There are non-well-
founded sets.”). Clearly the former is a legitimate extension, since it
is what we (as a matter of fact) use now on the basis of our concept
36The original French reads:
Je dirai qu’un ensemble est ordinaire lorsqu’il ne donne lieu qu’a des de-
scentes finies; je dirai qu’il est extraordinaire lorsque parmi ses descentes
il y en a qui sont infinies. ([Mirimanoff, 1917], p. 42)
23
of cumulative type structure . Is the latter a legitimate extension of
ZF-Foundation? One might be tempted to answer no: The iterative
conception of set clearly prohibits the existence of non-well-founded
sets.
The iterative conception is emphatically not Mirimanoff’s concep-
tion of set, however. Whilst he has the concept of ordinal and rank in
play37, it is not really until Zermelo (in [Zermelo, 1930]) that we start to
see the idea of cumulative type structure emerge, solidified in Go¨del’s
work on L (in [Go¨del, 1940]), and it was not until the late 1960s and
1970s that the idea of the iterative conception and its relation to ZFC
were fully isolated.38 The following situation is then possible: Suppose
that instead of the iterative conception becoming the default concep-
tion of set, the graph conception of set (on which sets are viewed as
kinds of directed graphs) became our the default set-theoretic concep-
tion (let’s say this was motivated by considerations about non-well-
founded sets emerging in computer science).39 Then, it seems reason-
able to accept that Mirimanoff’s intellectual descendants would have
accepted that there were non-well-founded sets. By the MDA, he can’t
then have been fully informally rigorous, since there are inconsistent
ways of extending the concept he was employing about his discourse.
It is then tempting to say that Mirimanoff’s thinking might be best
captured by first-order ZF without Foundation. We should resist this
temptation. For Mirimanoff’s context is plausibly one in which he was
informally rigorous about what the natural numbers were, and indeed
his work comes after Dedekind’s categoricity proof (in [Dedekind, 1888]).
In particular, his definition of well-foundedness depends on the notion
of finiteness; he characterises well-founded sets as those which only
have finite descending membership chains, rather than using the con-
temporary first-order statement of the Axiom of Foundation in terms
of the claim that every non-empty setA contains a setB such thatAXB
is empty. But, by the Compactness Theorem, finiteness cannot be char-
acterised using first-order logic, nor can the natural numbers.40 It is
overwhelmingly likely that he would have not accepted non-standard
models of arithmetic as legitimate interpretations in the same sense as
37The notion of ordinal recurs throughout his discussion of the Burali-Forti Para-
dox, and he discusses the notion of rank on p. 51 of [Mirimanoff, 1917].
38In [Boolos, 1971], for example. See [Kanamori, 1996] for a thorough discussion
of the history.
39See here [Incurvati, 2014] for a description of the graph conception.
40In fact, being able to capture these two notions is roughly equivalent, since “x is
finite” can be parsed in terms of being bijective with a standard natural number, and
“x is standard natural number” can be parsed as being a finite successor-distance
away from 0. See [Shapiro, 2001] (p. 155) for the details.
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his own.
Since Mirimanoff was also well aware that arithmetic could be coded
in set theory, we are at a point where we would like to say that his dis-
course about parts of set theory such as the natural numbers and finite
sets are informally rigorous and determined a particular structure. It is
also plausible that he was informally rigorous around 1915 about the
notion of real number, by this stage he was working on the intellectual
foundations that had already been laid by Cauchy, Weirstrass, Cantor,
and Dedekind, and the categoricity of the real line had been proved.
However, by the MDA, his discourse about set theory in general was
not informally rigorous. Thus, if we are to provide an axiomatisation
for underwriting his discourse and concept of set, we should use a the-
ory and logic that is not fully categorical, but nonetheless can identify
parts of set theory up to isomorphism.
What should we say about Mirimanoff’s level of informal rigour?
Well, to review:
(1.) His concept of set did not clearly support the Axiom of Founda-
tion.
(2.) It is highly plausible that he was informally rigorous about the
natural numbers and the real numbers.
(3.) It is highly plausible that he was informally rigorous about the
concept of well-order (being able to distinguish and talk about the
extraordinary and ordinary sets).
We can then say that Mirimanoff’s level of informal rigour about
set theory can be roughly characterised by ZFC2QW´Foundation (i.e.
ZFC2QW with the Axiom of Foundation removed). There, we can char-
acterise the usual objects of mathematics including the real, rational,
and natural numbers (since the categorical characterisations of these
theories do not depend on the Axiom of Foundation). Moreover, he
can formulate and discuss his worries about well-foundedness in this
logic. However, he is not fully informally rigorous, since there are in-
compatible legitimate expansions of the concept concept he was work-
ing with (namely to one supporting the foundation axiom and to one
supporting its negation).
We should remark though that Mirimanoff’s situation is more like
the situation we have with the Axiom of Parallels in geometry, rather
than what we have in ZFC2. This is because there is no categoricity
proof forZFC2´Foundation as there are models ofZFC2´Foundation
in which Foundation holds and others in which it fails. So whilst our
example shows that there might have been a case where we failed to
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be informally rigorous about our notion of set, it does not yet show the
possibility of a situation where we are not, where we have the iterative
conception of set.
4.4 Informal rigour and the Continuum Hypothesis
So then: What now about our own thought concerning the Contin-
uum Hypothesis? My contention is that, given the Modal Definite-
ness Assumption, we have good reason to think that we are not fully
informally rigorous about our concept of set. To see this, it is use-
ful to consider two active programs targeting the resolution of CH in
the contemporary foundations of set theory, namely forcing axioms and
Woodin’s Ultimate-L programme.
We omit the details here, since they are technically rather tricky,
and many questions are still open. Both kinds of programme attempt
to incorporate notions of ‘maximality’; Ultimate-L by incorporating
large cardinals in an elegant manner, and forcing axioms by ensuring
that various kinds of subset exist. Both represent somewhat different
takes on how our concept of set may develop; Ultimate-L is trying
to get at the idea that the universe should be (in a precise sense) ‘or-
derly’41, and forcing axioms capture the idea that the universe is satu-
rated under the formation of certain kinds of set42.
Crucially, if we take the Ultimate-L approach, we can prove CH,
and strong forcing axioms (e.g. the Proper Forcing Axiom or PFA)
imply  CH. They therefore represent inconsistent extensions of our
current best theory of sets. They are also both seem legitimate; both
correspond to natural ways we might develop our set concept.
Given theMDA, it seems then that we are not fully informally rigor-
ous about our concept of set. It is also plausible, however, that we have
a good deal of informal rigour. We seem to have informal rigour about
the natural numbers, where the only known independent statements
are all equivalent to consistency statements, and the negation of these
are illegimate extensions (assuming that we think the axioms really are
consistent). In the case of analysis there are no obvious analogues of
CH for second-order arithmetic; in the presence of Projective Determi-
nacy there are no known sentences of ZFC independent from the the-
ory ZFC´Powerset`V “ Hpω1q (other than Go¨delian-style diagonal
sentences). Both Ultimate-L and forcing axioms agree that Projective
Determinacy is true. It also seems clear that our concept of cumulative
41Namely that it is “L-like” whilst being able to tolerate consistent large cardinal
axioms.
42Namely generics for certain partial orders and families of dense sets.
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hierarchy supports the idea that we are informally rigorous about the
claim that all sets are well-founded.
Given this, it seems that our level of informal rigour in the cumula-
tive hierarchy of sets might be manifested by ZFC2QW . In this theory,
we are able to define the natural numbers and reals up to isomorphism
(and hence have particular set-theoretic structures corresponding to
these), and all interpretations of our thought are well-founded. How-
ever we can also point out.
Fact. There are models of ZFC2QW in which CH holds, and models of
ZFC2QW in which CH fails.43
Thus, given the MDA and the Manifestation Thesis, we might think
that our current level of informal rigour is manifested by ZFC2QW ; a
logic intermediate between first- and second-order.
5 Objections and replies
In this section I’ll consider some objections and replies. These will
not only help to shore up my position, but also will help to see some
features of the account.
Objection. What about the Zermelo-Shepherdson Categoricity Theorem?
One question for the arguments I have posed is immediate: What be-
comes of the the Zermelo-Shepherdson Quasi-Categoricity Theorem?
One might think that the theorem shows that our thought about the
43I am grateful to Victoria Gitman for working with me on the following proof:
Proof. Start in a model M |ù ZFC `  CH (by preparatory forcing if necessary).
Next collapse |PMpωq| to ω1 using the forcing poset Colpω1,Ppωqq inM. By design,
MrGs |ù CH. But MrGs also has the same countable relations as M, since it is a
standard fact about Colpω1,Ppωqq that is is countably closed. (If a countable relation
R were added, one can look at the countably many conditions pn P Colpω1,Ppωqq
forcing that 9x P 9R, and (by countable closure) infer that R was already inM.) Thus
M andMrGs:
(i) Have the same countable relations on sets in V (for this reason M and MrGs
have the same reals).
(ii) Differ on the truth value of CH.
Hence MrGs thinks that both M and MrGs satisfy ZFC2QW (since, according to
MrGs, M has all its countable relations) but differ on CH. Hence CH is not fixed by
ZFC2QW .
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sets is informally rigorous and determines some particular structures
(for example those with a specific number of inaccessible cardinals).
Earlier, I claimed that it is plausible that there are extensions of our
current set concept that support Ultimate-L and and others that sup-
port forcing axioms (let’s take PFA to make things concrete). I then
claimed on the basis of the MDA that our set-theoretic discourse and
concepts were not informally rigorous. But this is not so (so one might
counter-argue) whilst both PFA and Ultimate-L are (we assume) con-
sistent with ZFC2, only one of them can be true under ZFC2 with the
standard semantics, the other will require a Henkin-style interpreta-
tion to make both it and ZFC2 true. So it is just not correct to say that
both are legitimate; the concept that motivates a theory that is false
under the standard semantics requires non-standardness of a certain
kind (albeit not as serious as the one required for e.g.  ConpZFC2q).
The issue here is that this objection assumes that we have access
to the range of the second-order variables in making the criticism. We
already need to be informal rigorous about the range of second-order
variables if we are to hold that ZFC2 is a good encoding of our level of
informal rigour. Similar points have been repeatedly stressed through-
out the literature44, but it is particularly relevant to the current context;
a categoricity theorem is meant to encode informal rigour that we have
about a certain subject matter, not give us informal rigour. If there is
no informal rigour (which I’ve argued on the basis of the Modal Defi-
niteness Assumption) it is not necessary for us to accept that the cate-
goricity theorem yields genuine clarity.45
It is instructive here to consider our different interpretations of in-
formal rigour. Isaacson’s Kreisel should accept (contrary to what Isaac-
son claims) that there are different legitimate extensions of our concept
of set. This is because for Isaacson’s Kreisel, informal rigour is depen-
dent upon the degree to which we have understood a mathematical
subject matter. If we expand our concept of set C0 to one C1 producing
44See [Meadows, 2013] for a survey. Hamkins is also explicit about the point when
discussing a version of the categoricity argument in [Martin, 2001]:
The multiversist objects to Martin’s presumption that we are able to
compare the two set concepts in a coherent way. Which set concept
are we using when undertaking the comparison? ([Hamkins, 2012b],
p. 427)
45A different move here would be to shift to internal categoricity (an argument of
this form is presented by [Button and Walsh, 2018]). If one buys theMDA, one will be
forced to accept some indeterminacy, for internal categoricity this may be in either the
range of the first-order quantifiers or in the use of classical logic. See [Scambler, S]
for discussion of this issue.
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a consistent axiomatisation (as, let’s assume, both Ultimate-L and PFA
do) our understanding should be cashed out in terms of this new con-
cept C1, and this determines (given that we are employing C1) a subject
matter that supports either PFA or Ultimate-L, depending on which
route we pick. Given then that for Isaacson’s Kreisel the subject mat-
ter we talk about is determined by the concepts we employ, he should
accept that we are able to go in different possible directions with our
concept, and thus that we are currently not informally rigorous; our
set-theoretic discourse is ambiguous between several different sharp-
enings of the notion.
For exactly the same reason, the Weak Kreiselian Platonist should
accept that we are not fully informally rigorous about our concept of
set. Recall that for her, informal rigour should be understood as com-
ing to employ ever more platonistically existing precise concepts of
set. But for this reason, it’s entirely possible that we select one concept
that supports PFA in the future and also possible that we select one
that supports Ultimate-L. In this way, our thinking might be currently
ambiguous between several different sharpenings of the concept.
The only person who can argue that the quasi-categoricity theorem
in fact shows that ZFC2 encodes our level of informal rigour is the
Strong Kreiselian Platonist. They hold that there is a unique correct
concept that we are tending towards using informal rigour. This con-
cept can then serve to interpret the second-order variables, given that
ZFC2 is already quasi-categorical. Therefore (they claim) the case as
I’ve set things up is not possible; one of PFA and Ultimate-L (or nei-
ther) is correct about this concept, and the process of informal rigour
will lead us towards it. Therefore, exactly one or neither of PFA and
Ultimate-L is legitimate, and it is just not possible to legitimately ex-
pand our concept in incompatible ways. Hence, even given the MDA,
we have informal rigour, there are just not incompatible extensions of
our concept.
This represents a coherent position, but not one that I find very
plausible. The Strong Kreiselian Platonist has to accept that we simply
could not coherently follow a different intellectual path from the one
we have. But this is an enormously strong claim! What about cases
where the kinds of modelling requirements we encounter are very dif-
ferent? Suppose, for example, that there are two physically (or even
metaphysically) possible worlds at which the modelling requirements
for foundations are very different, and one suggests Ultimate-L where
the other suggests PFA. Should we insist there that the agents at that
world are doing something illegitimate if they select the ‘wrong’ con-
cept of set to work with? It seems to me that the agents in the two
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different cases simply employ different concepts, and use them to talk
about different subject matters. But this is not an analysis available to
the Strong Kreselian Platonist, she has to either accept that there is a
fundamentally ‘correct’ interpretation for the second-order variables,
and the thinking of one of the two communities’ thinking is quite sim-
ply flawed, or has to deny that such a situation is really possible.
The situation can be made more vivid by a kind of pessamistic
probabilistic argument. Assume that we do have a fully determinate
interpretation ofZFC2. Notice that it might be that in fact both Ultimate-
L and PFA are false in their full generality, even if one is correct about
the status of CH. In fact, there are myriad different ways we might de-
velop our set-theoretic axiomatisation, so why should we expect the
one we pick to be right? Our understanding of the Generalised Con-
tinuum Hypothesis tells us that we can consistently have pretty much
whatever pattern we like for the cardinal behaviour of infinite pow-
ersets, as well as a whole gamut of set-theoretic principles. So, if we
believe that there really is a fully determinate ZFC2 model below the
first inaccessible, it is overwhelmingly unlikely (without further argu-
ment) that we pick exactly the right axiomatisation, and it is we who
are saying false things, and can only be interpreted as speaking con-
sistently about non-standard Henkin interpretations.
Perhaps the steadfast believer in full informal rigour concerning
the cumulative hierarchy will dig her heels in at this point and say that
either we are (a) unlucky and fatally flawed, or (b) either very lucky
and/or there is some magic principle that will lead us to the choice
of correct axiomatisation. There is certainly no contradiction in taking
this stance, however (a) is not particularly useful for developing math-
ematical axiomatisations (we will likely go off on a fundamentally in-
correct road), and (b) immediately raises the question of exactly how
we could determine whether or not one of the multitude of seemingly
legitimate axiomatisations is correct. Here is what I think is a more
plausible take on the matter: Whilst we are not yet informally rigor-
ous about our concept of set, we might be in the future. Just look, for
example, at the progress that has been made in the hundred years or
so since Mirimanoff was writing; our concept of set clearly now under-
writes the claim that all sets are well-founded. Perhaps in the future
we will come to a fully informally rigorous conception of set, however
if we do so we should acknowledge that it is not the case that things
had to be this way.
We can still accept some implications for the quasi-categoricity the-
orem even given this picture. For, the quasi-categoricity theorem es-
tablishes that given an interpretation of the second-order variables, a
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particular structure is identified by ZFC2 (with some specific bound
on the inaccessibles).46 We might think that this fact has philosophi-
cal import. Meadows (in [Meadows, 2013]) identifies three roles for a
categoricity theorem:
(1.) to demonstrate that there is a unique structure which
corresponds to some mathematical intuition or prac-
tice;
(2.) to demonstrate that a theory picks out a unique struc-
ture; and
(3.) to classify different types of theory. ([Meadows, 2013],
p. 526)
He is sceptical about the possibility of (1.) for similar reasons to
those I have presented here: The categoricity theorem presupposes
the determinacy of the notions it is trying to characterise. However,
this is precisely what informal rigour is meant to do; given that we
have convinced ourselves of informal rigour, the categoricity theo-
rem tells us that our axiomatisation of this notion has been success-
ful. (2.) is thus important; once we believe we have informal rigour,
we need to provide a categorical characterisation to manifest this in-
formal rigour (and ensure that the clarity is genuine). I have argued
that for set theory, we are not quite there. However, (3.) is impor-
tant whether or not we actually have informal rigour. The categoric-
ity theorem for ZFC2, no matter whether or not we are precise about
exactly what structure it is about, does tell us that set theory is non-
algebraic. It tells us that our thought at least aims at specifying a
particular structure, and hence is not like concepts and theories of
general structure (such as that of group) that explicitly aim at dealing
with many different non-isomorphic structures. Inside every model
of ZFC2QW (which I’ve argued is the most natural theory for repre-
senting our thought about sets), the Zermelo-Shepherdson Categoric-
ity Theorem holds and ZFC2 (with a specific bound on the inaccessi-
bles) is a theory for talking about one isomorphic structure. It is just
46Multiversists are often explicit on this point. For example Hamkins writes:
If we make explicit the role of the background set-theoretic context,
then the argument appears to reduce to the claim that within any fixed
set-theoretic background concept, any set concept that has all the sets
agrees with that background concept; and hence any two of them agree
with each other. But such a claim seems far from categoricity, should
one entertain the idea that there can be different incompatible set-
theoretic backgrounds. ([Hamkins, 2012b], p. 427)
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that this structure can vary across different models of ZFC2QW . Whilst
we are not informally rigorous about set theory, the categoricity theo-
rem shows that this situation is intolerable, there is pressure to become
informally rigorous about set theory, even if we currently lack it. This
shows that the Difference Thesis (that the case of PP and CH are funda-
mentally different from one another) can be retained, even in the face
of less than full informal rigour in our set concept.
This observation shows that the distinction between particular and
general structures, whilst not incorrect per se, is rather coarse grained.
In particular, the idea of general structure further subdivides. First,
there are those general structures whose concept does not produce a
theory for which there is a categoricity proof (e.g. group), and thus
there is no pressure to hold that informal rigour requires us to deter-
mine a particular structure. Call these intentionally general structures.
There are other concepts (e.g. set below the first inaccessible) where we do
have an axiomatisation with a categoricity proof, even if we don’t take
ourselves to be informally rigorous. We call these unintentionally gen-
eral structures. For set theory, structure we currently talk about is not
particular, but given a refinement of the concept we may determine a
particular structure at some future point in time. Moreover, there are
portions of structures corresponding to this concept that are particular
(e.g. the representations of countable structures within models of the-
ories corresponding to our set concept), whereas this is different for
intentionally general structures such as the one corresponding to the
concept group.
Challenge. How do we know when we reach informal rigour? In re-
sponding to the last objection, I suggested that there are certain con-
cepts (and discourse) about which we are not yet informally rigorous,
but there is nonetheless pressure to become informally rigorous. This
immediately raises the following question: How do we know when
we are informally rigorous?
My answer here is a little speculative, but it suggests some interest-
ing directions for future research. We begin with the following idea:
Definition. (Informal and Philosophical) We say that a theory T ex-
hibits a high-degree of theoretical completeness when there are no known
sentences other than meta-theoretic sentences (e.g. Go¨delian diagonal
sentences) independent from T.
I acknowledge that this definition is somewhat imprecise. In par-
ticular I have no technical account on offer of what is meant by ‘meta-
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theoretic’ statements, and I hope that future philosophical research
will clarify this notion further. However, it seems that we have some
handle on the notion though, there seems to be a sense in whichConpZFCq
is a statement of a very different kind from CH.47
Given a handle upon the notion, I have the following suggestion;
a good indicator48 of informal rigour is the existence of a categoric-
ity theorem for the relevant second-order theory and a high-degree of
theoretical completeness (i.e. the only known sentences independent
from our theory are obviously meta-theoretic in some way). If this is
the case, then if we take ourselves to be informally rigorous and in fact
all known independent statements are meta-theoretic, then we can’t
construct the kind of simplistic argument from the MDA that I’ve con-
sidered here; any known candidate independent statement does not
correspond to a legitimate extension of the concept by design.49
This is precisely our current situation in arithmetic. Moreover, as
mentioned earlier, if we accept50 Projective Determinacy (which is agreed
on by both Ultimate-L and PFA, since they both imply ADLpRq)51 then
the same situation holds for analysis; the only sentences about Hpω1q
that are known to be independent from ZFC ` PD are meta-theoretic
in some way.52 As we’ve seen, our current set-theoretic concept lacks
this feature. It is this that will enable us to avoid examples of the kind
47Not least because the former is absolute for well-founded models of ZFC,
which I’ve argued our concept of set is sufficient to determine.
48I stop short of claiming full sufficiency, simply because I’m not clear that these
requirements are sufficient and I don’t want to overstate my case. The conjecture
that replaces “good indicator” with “sufficient” is still worthy of study.
49Walter Dean suggests that this part of my view can be seen as a kind of tran-
scendental refutation of the existence of Orey sentences for a given concept. This
seems to be precisely what informal rigour should be aiming at; removing the Orey-
phenomenon wherever possible by determining a particular structure.
50This is far from controversial. Other scholars (e.g. [Barton and Friedman, 2017],
[Barton, 2019], [Antos et al., S]) consider versions of the Inner Model Hypothesis (IMH),
an axiom candidate relying on extensions of the universe that implies that PD is
false. An interesting fact, though one that represents a slight digression (and so I
don’t include it in the main body of the text) is that (i) this axiom can be coded
in strong impredicative class theories (see here [Antos et al., S]) without referring
to extensions (other than through coding), and (ii) the IMH implies that there are
no inaccessible cardinals in V . A sufficiently strong version of ZFC2 with the IMH
added would thus be a fully (rather than quasi) categorical axiomatisation. The IMH
unfortunately does not touch CH (and so we could still construct the sameMDA-style
argument), however there are variations of the IMH (e.g. the Strong Inner Model
Hypothesis SIMH) that imply that CH fails badly. There is a large community of set
theorists that do regard PD as well-justified, however (see here [Koellner, 2014]) and
so I set this point aside for the purposes of this paper.
51See [Woodin, 2017] and [Steel, 2005] respectively.
52See here [Woodin, 2001] and [Welch, 2014].
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given earlier where we consider two different legitimate extensions,
since our informally rigorous concept should immediately tell us that
one or the other extension is illegitimate. Thus, if my conjecture that
a high-degree of theoretical completeness in combination with a cate-
goricity proof is a good-indication of informal rigour, and if we accept
PD, and if we accept that we do not have a high-degree of theoreti-
cal completeness with respect to set theory, then this supports the idea
that ZFC2QW is a good axiomatisation of our current level of informal
rigour, since those concepts for which we have a high-degree of theo-
retical completeness can be determined up to isomorphism, and those
which do not cannot.
Of course, given the claim that theoretical completeness in com-
bination with categoricity likely yields informal rigour, our belief in
informal rigour is defeasible. It could be, for example, that we discover
techniques that allow us to find non-meta-theoretic sentences indepen-
dent from our current theories of arithmetic and analysis. Hamkins
entertains this suggestion:
My long-term expectation is that technical developments
will eventually arise that provide a forcing analogue for
arithmetic, allowing us to modify diverse models of arith-
metic in a fundamental and flexible way, just as we now
modify models of set theory by forcing, and this devel-
opment will challenge our confidence in the uniqueness
of the natural number structure, just as set-theoretic forc-
ing has challenged our confidence in a unique absolute set-
theoretic universe. ([Hamkins, 2012b], p. 428)
Perhaps then one thinks that my account goes too far: Surely we
should not allow arithmetic to fail to be informally rigorous in such a
situation?
I am quite happy to bite this bullet. If a technique along Hamkins’
lines were to be found, I would accept that, after all, our thought con-
cerning arithmetic is not determinate on the basis of the MDA. Given
my current evidence however, I find this overwhelmingly unlikely; all
such evidence (categoricity, theoretical completeness) seems to indi-
cate that we are informally rigorous, and thus I find it likely that no
such technique will be forthcoming.
Objection. Mathematics is necessary! It is very natural at this point to
make the following objection: I have claimed that our concept of set is
currently not informally rigorous and fails to determine a truth-value
for CH. However I’ve also left open the possibility that in the future
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we might have an informally rigorous concept of set that determines
CH. Moreover, I think that the Axiom of Foundation was not deter-
minate for Mirimanoff’s discourse about sets, whereas it is true given
our concept of set. But don’t I think then that mathematical truth can
vary? Doesn’t this contradict the widely held assumption that mathe-
matical truth is necessary? My answer: Yes and no. We can have similar
discourses using terms like “set” that are interpreted in very different
ways at different times. However once the underlying concept of a
discipline is fixed, the truths about that concept at that time are neces-
sary. The only way that truth involving the discourse can vary is by
the underlying concepts changing somehow.53 So if by “mathematical
truth is necessary” we mean “all truths about every mathematical dis-
course are fixed” then mathematical truth is not necessary, however
if we mean “what is true of particular concepts at particular times is
fixed” then mathematical truth is necessary.
A comparison case is useful here. Sheldon Smith (in [Smith, 2015])
argues (convincingly, in my opinion) that Newton’s thought involving
the concept derivative could have been sharpened into several precise
non-extensionally-equivalent concepts. Two such are the contempo-
rary conception of standard derivative, and the symmetric derivative.
For the purposes of our discussion it isn’t terribly important how these
are defined, but they are not extensionally equivalent (for example,
if we consider the absolute value function fpxq “ |x|, the standard
derivative is undefined at the origin, whereas it is the constant 0 func-
tion (i.e. the x-axis) for the symmetric derivative). Let us suppose
(as Smith argues) that Newton’s concept derivativeNewton admitted of
sharpenings to our concepts standard derivative and symmetric deriva-
tive. Then we should hold that Newton’s discourse about the deriva-
tive of functions did not determine a truth value for the sentence “The
derivative of the absolute value function at the origin is the constant 0
function”. However, that sentence from our discourse is naturally in-
terpreted (in most contexts) as false, since the concept to be employed
(without further specification) for us is standard derivative, and the ab-
solute value function has no derivative at the origin for the standard
derivative.54 But we should not think that such an example seriously
53This idea has much in common with the discussion in [Ferreiro´s, 2016] of the
idea of invention cum discovery.
54Thanks here to Zeynep Soysal for suggesting that the concept of derivative
might be a pertinent comparison case. See [Smith, 2015] for the details. That pa-
per also contains several interesting remarks about how we might think concep-
tual indeterminacy and optimal theories relate in this context, critically examining
[Rey, 1998]’s suggestion that we can implicitly think with a particular concept in
virtue of deference to an optimal theory.
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threatens the idea that mathematical truth is necessary, since the un-
derlying concepts have changed in some way.55
Objection. First-order schemas and second-order interpretations. A key
part of Kreisel’s 1967 paper is the idea that our commitment to first-
order schemas is dependent upon the relevant second-order formula-
tions (e.g. Replacement):
A moment’s reflection shows that the evidence of the first
order axiom schema56 derives from the second order schema:
the difference is that when one puts down the first order
schema one is supposed to have convinced oneself that the
specific formulae used (in particular, the logical operations)
are well defined in any structure that one considers...([Kreisel, 1967],
p. 148.)
His idea is that the informal rigour about the second-order concept
is precisely what motivates the first-order schema. Since we are precise
about the relevant particular structure, we can see that the first-order
schema is always true on this structure, and this is what justifies the
principle. Given this claim, and the fact that I have advocated an inde-
terminacy in the second-order quantifiers in certain contexts, does this
undercut the motivation for the first-order schema of Replacement in
terms of its second-order formulations?
Kreisel’s point is controversial, but even if we accept the idea my
response is quick: No. This is because the motivation for the first-
order schema could be interpreted as follows: Given any particular
interpretation of the second-order variables (a notion which I take to
be indeterminate) the first-order schema is true. I do not need to be
precise about the interpretation of the second-order variables in order
to say that however I interpret them, the first-order schemata holds
(this is itself a schematic claim). Kreisel seems to be assuming here
that an acceptance of meaningful impredicative second-order theories
entails a commitment to determinacy in how the quantifiers are inter-
preted, but this is a mistake, one can perfectly well accept impredica-
tive second-order theories whilst denying that they have determinate
interpretation.57
55Whether or not they are the same concept is a question we leave open and will
mention in the conclusion.
56Here, Kreisel is in fact talking about induction schema in PA, but the point
transfers to Replacement.
57This point has been made increasingly vivid by the recent boom in the study of
(sub-)systems of second-order set theory.
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Objection. You’ve used notions that are dependent upon a definite concept
of set in characterising the debate. A further question is the following: Of-
ten I have used phrases like “range of the second-order variables” or
“isomorphism” that are naturally interpreted as involving essentially
higher-order concepts. But, by my own lights, these notions are in-
determinate (for example, I can make two unstructured sets A and B
such that |A| ă |B| isomorphic by collapsing |B| to |A|). How is this
legitimate given that I take our talk about sets to be indeterminate?
There are a two points to make here:
First, I do take myself to be informally rigorous about a good deal
of mathematics. I think it is likely that we, as a community, are infor-
mally rigorous about the real numbers and natural numbers, and the
concept of well-foundedness. Thus, my view does not collapse into an
‘anything goes’ relativism.
Second, we can think of this paper as a modelling exercise con-
cerning what we might be able to say about our current thought in
the future. I might begin by saying “Suppose that we were informally
rigorous about our concept set, what should we then say about our
current thought?” I then take myself to have fixed some particular
structureM about which I am informally rigorous and satisfies ZFC2
(possibly with a Henkin interpretation!) and analyse how the debate
might be interpreted relative to M (e.g. that from the perspective of
this hypothetical fixed universe58, our current thought would be best
axiomatised by ZFC2QW ). This will then resemble how our intellec-
tual descendants who are informally rigorous (should there be any)
might think of our thought, much as how we now look at Mirimanoff’s
thought as indeterminate.
6 Conclusions and open questions
In this paper, I’ve argued that our level of informal rigour in set the-
ory is insufficient to convince us that our discourse and concepts de-
termine a particular set-theoretic structure. I’ve argued instead that
we should admit some structural relativity into our characterisations
of structures, and a logic weaker than second-order is appropriate for
characterising our current thought about sets (in particular ZFC2QW ).
I’ve also argued, however, that there is pressure on us to develop a
58There are options here for how we might interpret this reference. It
might be interpreted as picking out a specific such M (as outlined in
[Breckenridge and Magidor, 2012]) or an ‘arbitrary’ such M in the style of
[Fine and Tennant, 1983]. See [Horsten, 2019] for a recent treatment.
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more informally rigorous concept of set, and thereby answer questions
like CH. This identifies a fundamental distinction among the general
structures; we have structures that are unintentionally general (like the
structure corresponding to our discourse about sets) and those that are
intentionally general (like the group structure). This said, there are lots
of questions left open by the paper. I take this opportunity to raise
some of the main ones.
Question. What is the status of the Modal Definiteness As-
sumption?
For most of the paper, I was happy to take the MDA as an assump-
tion. I think given the kinds of possibilities described in the paper
(Mirimanoff’s futures, and our own), it’s a very plausible assumption.
This said, I am pretty convinced that both Kreisel and Isaacson would
be unhappy with it (since it obviously implies their position concern-
ing the determinateness of CH is false), and I haven’t subjected it to
really intense philosophical scrutiny. This is worth examination.
A second question concerns what kinds of particular structures are
determined by our discourse and set-theoretic concepts. Assuming
that I am right that ZFC2QW is the right axiomatisation of our current
discourse concerning set theory, there is the question of what is deter-
mined on this basis. By and large this theory has not (to my knowl-
edge) been studied in detail.59 There are some clear candidates for
particular structures that can be determined given an acceptance of
ZFC2QW , for example any countable structure can be captured (e.g.
the Shepherdson-Cohen minimal model), or models with minimality
properties (e.g Lℵ1 is particular, since every countable ordinal is partic-
ular and Lℵ1 is the minimal model containing every countable ordinal.
We therefore ask:
Question. What other structures (both set-theoretic and
non-set-theoretic) are particular, given that we accept that
our thought is axiomatised by ZFC2QW ?
Closely related is whether or not the only unintentionally general
structures we talk about are set-theoretic. For all I’ve said, it might just
be set theory that exhibits this feature. We might then ask:
59Much of what I’ve considered here was gleaned from [Shapiro, 2001] and
[Shapiro, 1991]. A recent contribution that briefly considers some other versions of
ZFCwith different underlying logics is [Kennedy et al., S] (esp. §8: Semantic Exten-
sions of ZFC).
38
Question. Are there other interesting unintentionally gen-
eral structures apart from set-theoretic ones?
Throughout the paper, I talked of concepts changing, for example
in the shift from Mirimanoff’s concept to our own, from Newton’s con-
cept of derivative, and from our own concept of set to that of our in-
tellectual descendants. An interesting philosophical question is then
in what sense there is a continuity of conceptual content and thought
between one intellectual generation and the next.60 We therefore ask:
Question. When a concept is made more precise, what re-
mains constant, and how should we understand this conti-
nuity?61
We save the toughest question for last. Throughout, I’ve talked
as though we might one day be informally rigorous about our con-
cept of set. However, this might just not be possible. Perhaps any
modification of the concept we suggest will be susceptible to decisive
objections. Perhaps the different possibilities for extending our con-
cept of set will all seem equally legitimate, and we simply cannot rea-
sonably pick any one concept, whatever the pressure from the quasi-
categoricity theorem.62 We therefore ask:
Question. Is it possible for us to legitimately develop an
informally rigorous concept of set?
Perhaps we can answer this question affirmatively, or perhaps we
are doomed to spend our days like a mathematical version of Buri-
dan’s Ass, trapped between equally (un)attractive options. Time will
tell.
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